Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- 1 Sweet Paul, 1903-30 -- 2 The Young Politician, 1930-39 -- 3 A Conquered World, 1939-45 -- 4 Apprentice Minister, 1945-48 -- 5 A Liberal in a High-Tory Cabinet, 1948-52 -- 6 The Greatest Country in the World, 1953-56 -- 7 Disappointment and Opposition, 1956-63 -- 8 Saving the World, 1963-64 -- 9 Dealing with Washington, 1964-65 -- 10 Vietnam and a Mood of Protest, 1965-67 -- 11 A Hard-Pressed Minister, 1967 -- 12 Defeat and the Senate, 1968-74 -- 13 Legacies, 1974-92 -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Illustration Credits -- Acknowledgments -- Index.

Donaghy shows that economic integration was offset to some extent by diverging views on Western political and military strategy. As Pearson's government pursued distinct foreign and defence policies, American policy-makers acknowledged that Canadian objectives legitimately differed from their own and adjusted their policies accordingly. For its part, Ottawa rarely moved without weighing the impact its initiatives might have on Washington. As a result, Canada and the United States found ways to accommodate each other's interests without seriously impairing bilateral cooperation.

Canadian international history is currently enjoying an Asian moment. A handful of younger scholars have cast their attention eastward, generating exciting new work on Canadian relations with specific countries and regions across the Pacific region. This article draws on some of their work, as well as the author's own long-standing research on Canada's Department of External Affairs, to weigh the Pacific's changing importance to Canada. The article argues that the domestic and foreign policies of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, elected in 1968, were truly transformational. Trudeau swept away the traditional hesitations and confining North Atlanticism that characterized the diplomacy of his postwar predecessors. Instead, he pursued a full-throttled policy of strategic engagement that repositioned Asia front and centre of contemporary Canadian foreign policy.

This paper re-examines Canada's response to the Suez Crisis within the context of its overall approach to the Middle East in the early 1950s. It reminds contemporary readers that most Canadian policymakers, including Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, viewed the distant and unfamiliar region with reserve, as one better left to the Great Powers to sort out. That view only changed in 1956, when the Suez Crisis, Anglo-American discord, and the possibility of nuclear war threatened Canadian strategic interests, transforming Canada into a small regional stakeholder.

In September 1954 forces from the People's Republic of China began shelling Chinese Nationalist positions on the tiny offshore islands that lay between the mainland and Formosa (present-day Taiwan). The outsized US response to this routine harassment sparked a Cold War confrontation that soon threatened to escalate out of control. This paper explores Canada's stake in that crisis. It follows Ottawa's early reaction to the events in the straits and traces foreign minister Lester B. Pearson's mediatory efforts to promote negotiations and a peaceful settlement. Pearson's liberal internationalist impulses, the paper argues, were always balanced and shaped by a realist calculation of where Canada's national interest lay. His doubts about the wisdom of US policy and his commitment to allied unity ensured that he beat a dignified retreat when the circumstances for peacemaking proved unpropitious.

Like any number of American allies, Canada declined to recognize the revolutionary government of the People's Republic of China, and helped exclude it from the United Nations in the 1950s. By the early 1960s, there were strong pressures for change. This article examines the efforts of Paul Martin, Sr., Canada's foreign minister from 1963 to 1968, to respond to those pressures and modernize his country's approach to the emerging Asian giant. After establishing Martin's diplomatic credentials, the paper traces the evolution of his attitude toward Beijing during the 1950s as he accepted the logic and necessity of recognition. Opposed by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson and many of his cabinet colleagues, who feared U.S. retaliation, Martin persisted in trying to win over their backing. Progress, when it finally came in 1966, was incremental and much too late, prompting critical attacks on the minister's reputation and his "hush puppy style."